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HENRY WAT'l'ERSON: HIS EARLY LIFE AND EVENTS LEADING 
UP TO HIS FIHST STEP INTO POLITICS 
CHAPTER I 
HENRY WATTERSON: HIS EARLY LIFE AND EVENTS LEADING UP TO HIS 
FIRST STEP INTO POLITICS 
The tariff question has beep important throughout 
our entire history. Tariffs existed during the Colonial 
days for the benefit of the Mother Country - England. After 
the Revolution, the States took advantage of their freedom 
to provide large revenues for themselves, until finally the 
Constitution of the Unit~d States gave Congress sole power 
to levy duties on imports. 
Tariffs have been levied for two important purposes. 
Revenue was the primary object of early tariffs, but from 
the first they were also used to stimulate industry along 
certain lines. This idea became known as the protective 
tariff and was demanded by the industrialists for the 
protection of their industries. The tariff had its ups and 
downs during our early history, reaching a high point just 
after the Civil War. As the revenue from imports created 
a surplus in the treasury, tariff rates were slightly 
lowered in 1872. The Panic of 1873 creating a deficit in 
the Treasury brought about a higher tariff in 1875. Demands 
for reductions and for increases made the tariff an important 
political issue from 1876 to 1900. 
One of the greatest advocates of a low tariff was 
Henry Watterson, editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal. 
This thesis is an attempt to outline Watterson's tariff 
ideas and activities in connection with the movement for 
tariff reduction. 
Henry Watterson was born in Washington, D.C., Feb-
1 ruary 16, 1840. His parents both had a great interest in 
politics and young Watterson grew up in a very political 
atmosphere. At the time of Henry Watterson's birth, his 
father was a member of the lower house from Tennessee, an 
2 
undoubting Democrat of the schools of Jefferson and Jackson, 
having succeeded James K. Polk in Congress. 2 Mrs. Watterson, 
who was from a very influential family herself, entered into 
the social atmosphere very quickly and soon became one of the 
great ladies of Washington society. Young Watterson acted as 
a House Page for a few years, though not officially accepted 
as such. 3 
Because of a slight defect in one of his eyes, which 
went totally blind in later years, Watterson received most 
1 Samuel W. Wilson, Histo~ of Kentuck~ Vol. II (Chicago-Louisville: S.J. C1areb:-Co., 192 ), p. 467 
2 Henry Watterson, Marse Henry - An Autobio~raPhY 
Vol. I, (New York: George N. Doran Co., 1919), p. 5 
3 Ibid., p. 36 
of his early education from private tutors. He nevertheless, 
attended a Protestant Episcopal School in Philadelphia for a 
short time. After reaching the age of eighteen, he divorced 
himself from formal educational contacts. An urge for close 
political relations surged through his veins, so he hastily 
packed his clothes and took the first train to Washington, 
where he could be with his father and with the friends he had 
made there previOusly.4 
3 
The Washington Playground was quite exciting to 
Watterson, but gradually this interest wore off to the extent 
that he felt it his grave responsibility to depart from such 
frivolousness and earn his own way in the world. His ambition 
at this time was to become a great man of letters, and he 
decided that New York was the proper starting place. But 
establishing a footing there was not easy, he found. Mr. 
Raymond of the Times, after hearing Watterson play the piano, 
in which from childhood he had received careful instruction, 
finally gave him a job as music critic during the absence of 
the regular critic. 5 Watterson labored at that position for 
a short time, but soon found that his limited knowledge of 
music did not justify his holding such a position. 
4 .!.!?!!!., p • 54 
5 Ibid., pp. 54-59 
Washington again called him. Mr. Jacob Thompson, who was 
then secretary of the Interior, offered him a clerkship, 
which, needless to say, he quickly accepted. 
At the beginning of the War between the States, 
Watterson having left the Interior Department, was working 
as Washington Correspondent for the Philadelphia Press. 
While residing at the Willard Hotel, he established an 
intimate acquaintance with Cameron, the new Secretary of 
War. 6 Through this friendship he was offered the position 
of private secretary to Mr. Cameron. Family and political 
connections prevented him from accepting a position under a 
Republican administration, so Watterson decided to go back 
home to Tennessee. But Tennessee was not the same. All his 
friends had been called off to war and his state was about 
to be invaded. 
Watterson was always passionately opposed to slavery, 
4 
a crank on the subject of personal liberty. He believed that 
secession was treason, that disunion was the height of folly, 
and that the South was bound to go down in the unequal strife. 
Nevertheless, sympathy for his native state and a desire to 
be with his friends threw him into the rebel camp, and, once 
there, he decided to go through with it.7 
6 ~.,pp. 81-82 
7 ~., p. 82 
5 
Commissioned as a Conrederate orricer, he rirst tried staff 
duty under General Leonidas Polk, who was making an expedi-
tion into western Kentucky. In a few weeks, illness overtook 
Watterson and he resigned himself to desultory newspaper work 
in Nashville, Tennessee. 8 With the raIl of Nashville, in the 
autumn of 1862, Watterson was forced to make a hasty departure. 
In his retreat from Nashville he met Nathan Bedford Forrest, 
who had just recently escaped from Fort Donelson. When 
Forrest was promoted to Brigadier General a few days later, 
he attached Watterson to his staff. Later he was made chief 
of scouts, and engaged in guerilla fighting against Union 
communications wherever possible. He interspersed these 
activities with newspaper work, primarily as editor or the 
Rebel, a Confederate newspaper in Chattanooga. 9 
Watterson had hopes of becoming rich during the war on 
possible commissions to be realized from Confederate cotton 
he planned to sell to English buyers. This vision of wealth 
exploded when the swiftly advancing Union armies captured the 
cotton and burned it. lO As cotton dealer, Watterson managed 
to cross the Union lines numerous times because of his 
friendship with high ranking Union officers. 
8 ~., p. 84 
9 ~., p. 85 
10 ~., p. 161 
6 
During the middle of 1865, Watterson returned to 
Tennessee where he met Albert Roberts and George Purvis, two 
boyhood and Confederate Army friends, who were on their way 
to Nashville, Albert's father, John Roberts, was the chief 
owner of the Nashville Republican Banner, an old and highly 
respectable newspaper, which had, for nearly four years, been 
in a state of suspension. Watterson and his friends decided 
to revive the publication of this paper, with Purvis as 
business manager and Roberts and Watterson as editors. Money 
was supplied by John Roberts, and soon the paper was thriv-
ing. ll Having a fairly sure income Watterson married Miss 
Rebecca Ewing on December 20, 1866. He also carried out the 
fulfillment of his dreams in a trip to London. From London 
he went to the continent where he hobnobbed with royalty.12 
Upon his return to the United States, two very im-
portant positions in Louisville were offered Watterson. 
These offers proved to be the turning point in his life be-
cause they started him on the road to become one of the 
country's best known editors. Louisville, at this time, had 
two important newspapers, the Journal and the Courier. 
11 ~., 'p.165 
12 .ill!!., p.165 
7 
George D. Prentice, who was then part owner of the ~ournal, 
offered Watterson part ownership and the position of editor. 
Mr. Haldeman, whom Watterson had known in the Confederacy and 
who owned the Courier, offered him the same terms. Watterson 
proposed that the Journal and Courier consolidate on an equal 
basis. Mr. Haldeman would not agree to the merger, so 
Watterson accepted the Journa~position and h~nered the 
Courier relentlessly. Haldeman soon saw the trend toward the 
Journal and in order to save himself, acquieced in the con-
solidation. Another Louisville paper, the Daily Democrat, 
was also absorbed. Watterson thus became, at the early age 
of twenty-eight, the editor and part owner of the Courier-
dournal, which made its first appearance November 8, 1868.13 
From that period on, until the time of his retirement 
from public life, which covered approximately fifty years, 
Watterson used his paper to expound the views of the Demo-
cratic Party and his own personal ideas on public questions. 
His sheer force of intellect and personality won for him 
many readers throughout the United States irrespective of 
their individual opinions. Personalities and reputations 
were not spared in his editorials, for Watterson was not 
afraid to write what he thought. Since he was definitely 
13 Ibid., p. 174 
8 
against the protective system, Watterson advocated Tariff Re-
form whole heartedly in his writings. He was never a free 
trader at heart, but believed that a tariff for revenue was 
the least oppressive and the safest support of the government. 
Watterson fought for that belief as strongly as he could. He 
forcefully expressed his own personal beliefs and those of the 
Tariff Reform Demoorats when, on April 29, 1884, he wrote: 
Kentucky stands as a stone wall in the center of the 
Democratic line of battle. We see only the enemy in 
front of us. Above us floats the free heart's hope and 
the free home's flag - the ensi~n of the fair and free 
government - bearing the motto Honesty, Eoonomy, 
Equality, and a Tariff for revenue onlyl" and what do we 
propose? We propose just taxation, we propose that the 
blessings of the government, like the dews of heaven, 
shall fall upon all alike. The tariff is a tax. As 
enacted by the Republicans it is paid by the poor. We 
propose that it shall be paid by the rich no less than 
the poor each according to his means. We propose that 
not a cent of it shall go to enrich individuals but that 
every cent of it shall go to the public treasury, and 
that no more of it shall be collected than is needed by 
that treasury. Millions if need be, for defense; not a 
penny for tribute. 14 
14 Arthur Krock, The Editorials of Henry Watterson 
(New York: George H. Doran-Company, 192~), pp. 62-63 
lUSE OF THE 'rARIFF QUESTION (1876-1884) 
CHAPTER II 
RISE OF THE TARIFF QUESr.HON (18'76 - 1884) 
Democrats and the tariff before 18'76. Vi.hen the 
Southern States withdrew from the Union, the control of the 
government went to the Republicans, who raised the tariff 
somewhat, even before the Civil War began. During the war, 
the tariff was raised still higher largely in order to pay 
part of the cost of the military operations. ~ben the South 
was again admitted into the Union, the industrialists had 
become powerful enough to maintain and even increase the high 
tariff rates. Henry Watterson, together with tariff reform-
ers of every description, from those favoring free trade to 
those merely desiring more reasonable and harmonious protec-
tion, repeatedly endeavored to bring about reductions, but 
were thwarted at every turn. The Democratic Party was split 
into two camps - those in the East favoring high protection 
and those in the South seeking low or moderate rates. With 
the Civil War gradually pushing itself into the background 
and the country getting itself back to normal, the pressure 
was taken off the Treasury, which began to show a surplus. 
It was evident that tax reduction was desirable. Some of the 
tariff reformers took part in the Libera,l Republican movement 
which disappOinted them by dropping the issue. To appease 
10 
the opposition, Congress made a general ten-percent reduction 
in tariff rates. Although this reduction did not represent 
what the tariff reformers desired, nevertheless, with the 
repeal of other taxes it slightly alleviated the pressing 
treasury surplus condition and prevented the Democrats from 
taking a definite stand. This ten-percent reduction was also 
reflected in the Republican platform of 1872,1 while Horace 
Greely, the nominee of the Liberal Republicans and the Demo-
cratic party, carried the banner of protection. Watterson 
was very much silrprised when Greely was nominated by the 
Liberal Republican convention. Charles Francis Adams was 
Watterson's choice and Watterson looked upon Greely as a man 
not fit for such an office. Of Greely Watterson wrote: 
He could never be relied upon in any coherent 
practical plan of campai~. To talk about him as a 
candidate was ridiculous. 2 
Watterson, however, had a real affection for Greely as an 
individual, and after recovering from the shock, managed to 
gather the Southern Democratic forces together to carryon a 
vigorous campaign. 3 Greely failed to attract a large vote 
in the North, however, and was overwhelmingly defeated by 
President Grant the Republican Candidate. 
1 Matthew Josephson, The Politicos (New York: 
Harcourt Brace and Company, I938), p. 165 
2 Watterson, ££. ~., Vol. I, p. 244 
3 Ibid., pp. 260-261 
11 
One year later the Panic of 1873 swept the country. 
The Treasury condition was reversed. This necessitated a 
repeal of the ten-percent reduction. The Democratic party 
attempted to present opposition, but they were divided. It 
was not until 1883 that they were able to partially unite on 
a tariff policy. 
Watterson and the National Convention of 1876. In 
1876 the Kentucky Democratic Convention chose Watterson a 
delegate-at-large to the National Democratic Convention of 
that year called to meet in St. Louis to put a presidential 
ticket in the field. 4 Although Watterson was then a member 
of the forty-fourth Congress, this appointment meant more to 
him than any other political position he could have held. It 
was not his intention to bind himself to any political office 
and, when one full term, and a half term, incident to the 
death of the sitting member for the Louisville district was 
open to him, he chose the short term. His feelings towards 
holding office were fully expressed when he wrote: 
Holding office, especially going to Congress, had 
never entered any wish or scheme of mine. Office seemed 
to me ever a badge of bondage. I knew too much of the 
National Capital to be allured by its evanescent and 
lightsome honors. When opportunity sought me out none of 
4 Watterson, ££. £!!., Vol. II, p. 178 
12 
its illusions appealed to me. But after a long uphill 
fight for personal and political recognition in Kentucky, 
an election put a kind of seal upon victory I had won and 
enabled me in a way to triumph over my enemies. 5 
While he was a member of the forty-fourth Congress 
Watterson became an ardent supporter and personal friend of 
Samuel J. Tilden, and helped in the nomination of Tilden for 
the presidency. The night before the National· Convention was 
to convene, the anti-Tilden men put up the Honorable S. S. Cox 
for temporary chairman. This was a very clever move, as Cox 
then had the rull backing of T~aany and was very popular 
everywhere, especially in the South. With Cox in the chair, 
his bakers felt that they would be able to gain a majority on 
the Resolutions Committee. Tilden's leading friends on the 
Committee, realizing that strong opposition was necessary, 
put Watterson in the field and he was chosen as the chairman., 
Controlling the Resolutions Committee, Watterson used his 
powers to make the party champion his tariff ideas. His 
opinions on the tariff were uncompromising. He had no 
patience with anything but a "Tariff for revenue only", and 
he had come to the Convention resolved to have his way on that 
point by writing the plank himself. His forcefulness and 
to-the-point-statements were obvious in the Democratic plat-
form, especially the tariff plank which read: 
5 Watterson, ££. ~., Vol. I, pp. 21-22 
13 
Reform is necessary in the sum and modes of federal 
taxation to the end that capital may be set free from 
distrust and labor lightly burdened. We denounce the 
present tariff levied upon nearly four thousand articles 
as a masterpiece of injustice, inequality and false 
pretense. It yields a dwindling and not a yearly rising 
revenue. It has impoverished many industries to sub-
sidize a few. It prohibits imports that might purchase 
the products of American labor. It has degraded American 
pommerce from the first to an inferior rank on the high 
seas. It has cut down the sales of American manufactured 
articles at home and abroad and depleted the returns of 
American agriculture - an industry followed by half our 
people. It costs the people five times more than it 
produces to the treasury, obstructs the processes of pro-
duction and wastes the fruits of labor. It promotes fraud, 
fosters smuggling, enriches dishonest officials, and bank-
rupts honest merchants. We demand that all custom-house 
taxation shall be for revenue. 6 
The Hayes-Tilden controversl and how Watterson !!!! 
about it. When the Democratic platform was finally completed 
and Tilden was nominated on the second ballot, Watterson ex-
ercised his editorial talents to make his personal friend the 
next president. When the electoral returns were counted it 
was apparent on the face of returns, Tilden had secured a 
victory. The Republicans grasped a slim thread of hope, 
though, when Senator Barnum of Connecticut, then financial 
head of the National Democratic Committee, inquired about the 
returns from Oregon, Louisiana, Florida, and South Carolina. 
Sinoe the faots were not known by the Democratic Party, the 
Republicans felt that this doubt could be used to advantage. 
6 Ida M. Tarbell, The Tariff in our Times, (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 19l!), pp. 82~3:--
14 
The New York Times, a Hayes-backer, exaggerated this doubt to 
the pOint that it soon became known over the entire nation. 
Watterson fought vigorously to prevent the doom which was fast 
falling upon his party, but the Republicans grasped every 
available string to put their man in the president's chair. 
In Louisiana a returning board was organized to investigate 
the votes. Corruption was in the air. That the returning 
board was for sale and could be bought was the universal im-
pression. Every day some one turned up with pretended 
authority and made an offer to sell. It was Watterson's own 
belief that the board was playing for the best price it could 
get from the Republicans and that the only effect of any offer 
to buy on the part of the Democrats would be to assist the 
scheme of blackmail. This belief was possibly why Watterson, 
when offered an attempt to buy the presidency for Tilden, 
declined the offer.? The men of the Returning Board, being 
refused their demands for cash by the Democrats, took their 
final pay, at least in patronage, from their own party. By 
throwing out Democratic returns they gave the electoral vote 
of Louisiana to Hayes. Similar action in South Carolina and 
Florida and the acceptance of these returns by the National 
Electoral Commission gave Hayes the Presidency by one vote: 
185 to 184. 
? Watterson, ~. £!!., Vol.I, p. 280 
15 
Watterson's views on Protective Tariff. The election 
of Hayes insured a victory for the Republican party, but 
Watterson refused to look upon it as a defeat for the re-
formers. He had finally established himself as a leader of 
,his party and he showed the persistence which characterized 
his entire political career. A relentless hammering against 
the bonds of protection was bound to bring success, he thought, 
and this he administered unceasingly. The detrimental 
effects of the tariffs on foreign trade were viewed by 
Watterson as serious. He believed his point was proved by 
the Panic of 1873, when the consumption of all manufactured 
articles greatly decreased. Production far exceeded demand 
to the extent that a great surplus was created on the American 
market. Year by year the prices of articles were lowered and 
the usual efforts were resorted to in order to stimulate 
demand, but such attempts were fruitless. Foreign markets 
were sought in order to eliminate this distress, but, accord-
ing to Watterson, our protective tariff discriminated so much 
against foreign nations that they avoided the United States 
and went where they could trade most profitably. In 1876 
Watterson voiced his feelings toward this deplorable con-
dition when of the manufacturers he wrote: 
They realize that they have a manufacturing capacity _ 
far in excess of the demands of internal trade. They 
admit it themselves and call for foreign markets which 
16 
they cannot get until they abandon their protection 
fallacy and pull down the tariff, which prevents the 
exchange of products with the world, to a simple revenue 
basis. 8 
The expansion of our exports would be commensurate with the 
reduction of the tariff he asserted. France was receiving 
American goods through England which had a commercial treaty 
with that country. A greater exchange of goods would be 
established if trade with France was direct, but that could 
only be accomplished through a low tariff which would offer 
an incentive for the exchange of products, declared Watterson. 9 
Since American manufacturers could produce in six to 
nine months what the home market could consume in one year, 
not only did the manufacturers suffer from a lack of full 
time production, but the laborer suffered from idleness for 
at least three months out of every year. This detrimental 
condition was supplemented by the fact that American labor 
was faced with competition from abroad; with one half million 
workingmen immigrating to America each year the American 
laborer was bound hand and foot by the capitalist wolves. 
He could not seek a higher plane of living, for if the 
manufacturer felt that the laborer demanded too much, he 
could use cheap labor from Europe, China, and Japan. This 
8 Courier-Journal, Louisville, Ky. 1876-97 ttEditorials tl 
August 23, 1878 ' 
9 ~., October 29, 1878 
17 
situation definitely favored the capitalists, for the tariff 
excluded the manufactured products which would compete with 
the property of the capitalists. In this way they could 
combine and offer their own prices for what they had to sell. 
The laborer was not favored however, for the wages he received 
were, according to Watterson, fixed by foreign competition. 
He could get his goods only by paying an extra fee, which was 
pocketed by the money men. Watterson summed up this condi-
tion when he tagged the existing tariff as a bill to protect 
the tfpauper labor of Europe" at the expense of the American 
consumer. 10 
The South and West were in no way omitted from 
Watterson's analysis of the protective tariff. With infant 
industries springing up in the Southern states, especially 
cotton manufacturers, it was necessary that cheaper 
machinery be obtainable, so that the South could compete with 
Great Britain on the markets of the world. The tariff 
established a high price on pig iron and machinery from Europe, 
and American manufacturers were fixing an equal price for 
machinery manufactured by them. ll 
10 Ibid., June 13, 1888 (Later Chinese exclusion and 
other immigration laws protected labor and removed some of 
this argument.) 
11 The cost of pig iron made in England was eight 
dollars a ton. A tariff of $6.72 was placed on all imported 
pig iron, which the Pennsylvania manufacturers added to their 
price. 
18 
In this way the industrialists compelled the Southern cotton 
men to buy at the price set by them, necessitating higher 
prices for Southern manufactured goods, so that competition 
with Great Britain was practically impossible. In addition 
to such increases in commodity prices, Watterson asserted 
that the protective tariff increased even to a greater extent 
the cost of transportation. The heavy tax of about seventy-
five percent on steel and iron added immensely to the oper-
ating expense of every road in the country he declared, and 
this was added by the laws of commerce, in one way or another, 
to the price of transportation. 12 In 1888 Watterson issued 
a general statistical report covering the period from 1850 to 
1880, on the increase in the total value of farms, farm 

























Taking all these items which make up our agricultural 
wealth it was found that in ten years under a system of tax-
ation limited to the needs of the government, the wealth of 
farmers increased one hundred one percent; while the total 
increase for twenty years under protection was about fifty 
per cent. Under a protective tariff then it took the farmer 
two years to save what he saved in one year under revenue 
only. 13 
Watterson chrunpioned the position of the masses when 
he waged unceasing war against the protective capitalists. 
His insistent demands for tariff reform were based on two 
general purposes: First, to relieve the treasury of the 
growing surplus which resulted from the collection of excess 
duties, and second, to reduce the tax burdens of the people. 14 
The protectionists realized that the treasury surplus had to 
be reduced and offered as a remedy, the repeal of the whisky 
and tobacco tax. This would leave untouched the tariff, but 
would relieve the treasury of some $28,000,000. Watterson 
denounced this scheme, saying "A reform which relieves the 
treasury, but, which does not relieve the people, will be not 
merely a blunder, but a crime. The repeal of the whole system 
13 Courier-Journal, Jan. 24, 1888 
14 Courier-Journal, June 25, 1887 
of internal taxation would prevent the accumulation of a 
surplus, but it would retain untouched the iniquitous war 
tariff, which according to the Democratic platform robs the 
people of five dollars for every one dollar conveyed to the 
treasury.n15 
20 
The Democrats had always contended that excessive 
taxation was a menace to good government and an injury to the 
industrial system, but they could never commit the supreme 
folly of repealing the whiskey tax, Watterson asserted. What 
the Democrats had promised was a reform of the tariff Which, 
while disposing of the surplus and reducing the revenues to 
the needs of an economical government, would remove the arbi-
trary restrictions from trade and would give to the consumer 
some of the privileges of which the tariff had deprived him 
for the benefit of the manufacturer. A revision of the tar-
iff which would enlarge the free list and reduce the rates of 
taxation on other articles could compass the objects in view. 
Nothing less than this would accomplish any permanent good or 
prevent a continued agitation of the subject, Watterson be-
lieved. 16 
15 Courier-Journal, June 25, 1887 
16 Courier-Journal, Aug., 1887 
) 
21 
The Democratic position on the tariff was not based 
merely upon the affect the tariff had on the people, but also 
upon the belief that it was unconstitutional. Watterson 
stated that throug~out its entire history, the Democratic 
party had been strictly constitutional in its beliefs. The 
only tariff ever contemplated by the Constitution according 
to Watterson, was one for revenue only. Article I, Section 
8 states that Congress shall have power "to lay and collect 
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises to pay the debts and 
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the 
United States."17 None but the willful misconstructionist, 
said Watterson could see anything in these provisions which 
permitted Congress to levy prodigious assessments on the 
majority of American people to pay a few individuals who were 
engaged in special occupations. The obvious meaning in those 
clauses, Watterson declared, was that "Congress has the power 
to establish a system of duties on imports to aid the 
accretion of revenue sufficient to meet the reasonable expen-
ses of the government ordinary or extraordinary.nl8 This 
interpretation of the tax clause was opposed by the Eastern 
manufacturers who controlled congressional legislation and 
demanded unjust taxation for the benefit of their products. 
17 Constitution of the United States Article 1, Sec-
tion 8. 
18 Courier-Journal, Jan. 6, 1881 
The sum total of all the aspects of the protective 
tariff surely painted a black picture, for Watterson felt 
that even those who argued for the protective system were 
hurt by its application. That the Courier-Journal and its 
22 
great editor were attacked as advocates of free trade can be 
understood, for Watterson and his paper never flinched from 
denouncing protection in any form. Watterson contended em-
phatically nevertheless that the intent of his policies was 
not to hurt business. Except in the denunciation of cheats 
and frauds, they were not extremists - as such they would 
never have secured or deserved the attention of the public -
but that attention was brought forth by the presentation 
"of many proofs of a perfectly practical realization of the 
business aspects of the question apart from its theoretical 
character.,,19 The tariff-reform Democrats were clear in their 
own minds that tariff reduction was a fair measure of reform. 
Since the existing tariff was established primarily as a war 
measure, the reason for its existence was gone. The promise 
by both parties to abate it, as soon as the exigency which 
had called it into being ceased to exist, was made, yet all of 
its ttJobs" except quinine remained. 20 Even the manufacturing 
19 Courier-Jo'll;I"nal, March 18, 1885 
20 Fredric Kep, Tariff Facts and Effects From 1789 -
1916, Montclair, N.J., "QUinine becaiiie"free in 1'S"19"".-
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interests realized its evils when they declared that the 
protective tariff was a positive injury to them and that they 
would be satisfied with a change. This fact was voiced in 
1877 by the woolen men at their annual convention and was 
also carried by other manufacturing interests which the tariff 
was designed to protect. 2l 
The first ray of hope for Watterson came early in 1878 
when the Wood Bill was introduced into the House. The average 
reduction in tariff rates proposed by this bill was not quite 
fifteen per cent. The revenue gain anticipated and the success 
of the proposed tariff bill depended upon the realization 
of two results: first, a cheaper and more effective system 
of collection; and second, an increased importation of goods. 
As to the first, there was, beyond question, an assurance 
of certain success; as to the second, the theory of the bill 
had the support of the well-known principle that reduced prices 
meant increased consumption. 22 Watterson felt that the bill 
deserved the cordial support of the people, for it made at 
least a beginning in tax reforms which were so imperatively 
needed. The defeat of the bill however, brought little protest 
from Watterson though, for its provisions were not the ultimate 
of his desires. The Democrats did not have the strength of 
21 Courier-Journal, October 25, 1877 
22 Courier-Journal, April 18, 1878 
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numbers to push their reforms to the point where they would 
not die in the committee but the next election could remove 
this difficulty. 
When the election of 1880 made a Republican, Garfield 
president, and gave the Republicans a majority in Congress, 
Watterson realized the temporary defeat of his reform ideas, 
which had again been adopted by the Democratic Convention. 
Garfield had previously advocated and voted for large reduc-
tions in iron and coal rates while he was a m~mber of Congress; 
but in the Chicago convention he was in perfect accord with 
other Republicans who wanted to keep the high war duties. Of 
Garfield, Watterson said, ttlf Garfield is elected president 
we may confidently expect an administration tariff so high in 
its terms and for the exclusive benefit of monopolies.,,23 
Subsequent history proved the essential correctness of his 
prophecy. 
The assassination of Garfield about four months after 
he had taken office prevented momentarily any action on the 
Republican platform pledges. On September 19, 1881, Vice 
President, Chester A. Arthur, took the oath of office as 
President of the United States. In his first annual message 
23 Courier-Journal, August 21, 1880 
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delivered on December 6, 1881, he recormnended: 
The tariff laws also need revision; but, that a due 
regard may be paid to the conflicting interests of our 
citizens, important changes should be made with caution. 
If a careful revision can not be made at this session, a 
commission such as was lately approved by the senate and 
is now recommended by the Secretary of the Treasury would 
doubtless lighten the labors of Congress whenever this 
subject shall be brought to its consideration. 24 
President Arthur and ~ Tariff Commission. Congress 
after the election of 1880 was confronted with the necessity 
of decisive action upon the tariff question. The demand for 
a general modification of the then existing war tariff had 
been mounting for years. Sentiment for revision had now be-
come strong, so that even organized industry no longer opposed 
it. In November, 1881, the Industrial League held a large 
tariff convention in New York, at which it was suggested that 
an expert tariff commission be appointed which would view the 
subject thoroughly, and recommend modifications, along pro-
tective lines. Arthur and Charles J. Folger, Secretary of 
State, advocated this suggestion for reasons of personal gain 
as well as political necessity. Because of these views, 
Congress authorized a tariff commission in an act which Arthur 
signed on May 15, 1882. 25 This commission was to investigate 
thoroughly all questions relating to the agricultural, 
24 James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messa~s 
and paters of the Presidents, (New YOrk: Bureau or-Nation 
LItera ure,-rnc., 1891), p. 4636 
25 Congressional Record, Vol. XIII, pp. 3110-31111 
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commercial, and industrial interests of the country, with a 
view to the establishment of a judicious tariff providing for 
justice for all interests. 26 Watterson and Representative 
John G. Carlisle,27 Watterson's personal friend, vigorously 
opposed the Commission, for they realized that the Republi-
cans were in control and that the commission would undoubtedly 
be protectionist. Carlisle frankly expressed his views on 
the subject when he said, "To provide such a commission would 
be tantamount to saying that the people were not capable of 
dealing with the subject of government. The tariff question 
could be finally settled only in Congress, and therefore a 
commission was neither necessary nor desirable; it would cost 
the taxpayer at least two dollars a day and there would be no 
compensation for the delay which it would cause."28 Carlisle 
wanted the tariff lowered on all commodities which the laborer 
and the farmer used, and he felt that the need for such re-
duction would be better recognized by representation of the 
people than by a commission. In spite of Carlisle's feelings 
and Watterson's demands, the Republicans pushed their measure. 
26 Idella Gwatkin Swisher, An Introduction to the Studz 
of the Tariff,(Pub. by the Dept. or-Living Costs Nat'~League 
or Women Voters, Wash., D. C., 1931-1932), p. 24 
27 Member of the House from Kentucky and a Tariff Reformer 
28 James A. Barnes, John G. Carlisle Financial States-
~, (New York: Dodd Mead ana-Go7 , 1931), p. 52 
27 
The fears of these two reformers were soon'realized, for a 
majority of members on the Commission were advocates of high 
protection, while no member could be said to represent that 
part of the public which believed a reduction of the pro-
tective duties to be desirable. This fact was better em-
phasized when Mr. John L. Hayes, the secretary of the Wool 
Manufacturers Association, was appOinted president of the 
commission. 29 
The Commission applied themselves to their task with 
c 
Wuch energy that by December 4, 1882, they had produced a 
voluminous report with suggested ammendments to the customs 
laws, which would produce a general reduction of about 
twenty-five per cent. 50 Although this was the work of eight 
men who favored protection, protectionists in the House were 
not satisfied. Again it was suggested that the best and 
quickest way to reduce taxation was to abolish or reduce items 
on the internal revenue list. Representatives of various 
industries opposed reduction. The bill finally passed, known 
as the Tariff Commission Bill, went into effect July 1, 1883. 
It maintained substantial shelter for manufactured articles 
by reducing the duties on raw materials and increasing the 
free list. The reduction of twenty-five per cent as suggested 
29 F. W. Taussig, Tariff History of the United States 
(New York & London: G. P. Putnam's Sons,~ignth Edition, 1931) 
p. 231. 
30 H. J. Ford, United States History 1865~1898. "Cleve-
land Era." (New Haven: Yale University ~ress, 1919) p. 35 
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by the commission was cut to five per cent. The wool growers 
industry received a severe blow when the uniform fixed rates 
on woolen cloth, as established in 1867, were changed to rates 
varying with the value of the goods. The actual reduction in 
duties on clothing wool amounted to 10.73 per cent while that 
on woolen goods was 1.01 per cent. 31 This comparison is 
shown as follows: 32 
In 1867 




1. If worth 80¢ or less 
per lb. 35¢ plus 35% 
[approximate duty 80%J 
2. If worth more than 
80¢ lb., 35¢ lb. plus 
40;( [approximate duty 
85~ 
The passage of the Tariff Commission Bill in no way 
dampened the spirit of Watterson and his reformists. The bill 
offered only a slight reduction in rates. The issue was brought 
more emphatically before the public during the 1882 campaign. 
As a result of the election of 1882 the Democrats now had a 
majority in the House and the Protectionists tasted a little 
of defeat when Representative Randall from Pennsylvania, a 
Democrat protectionist, was defeated for speakership, and 
John G. Carlisle was elevated to that post. Meanwhile Mr. 
Morrison, a strong reformer and friend of Watterson, became 
31 Tarbell, £E. cit., p. 131 
32 Tawssig, 2£. cit., p. 260 
29 
chairman or the WaYs and Means Committee. With these two men 
and others entrenched in Congress and Watterson, ever able 
with his pen, the march ror tariff reform was again urged at 
double time. On February 4, 1884, Morrison introduced a 
tariff reform bill in the House, based primarily on the 
principle or horizontal reduction. 33 The bill slightly 
deviated from this principle, however, in that some articles 
were reduced more than others, while a few were placed on the 
free list. Watterson's hesitancy in accepting the bill was 
primarily due to his desire for sharper reform, but in 
answer to some questions, made by the Atlanta Constitution, 
Watterson wrote, "The Courier-Journal is willing to accept 
and support the bill heartily because it is a step in the 
direction of practical reform. It may not be all we could 
ask, but if it is all we can get at present, we shall be 
satisfied until we can get more. Advocating such reform, how 
could any journal refuse to support this bill, unless there 
were a better one before congress?tt34 
The defeat of the Morrison Bill by the action of 
Tariff Democrats led by Randall, was at first a serious blow 
to Watterson. He denow~ced Randall and his clique for their 
33 A uniform reduction of duties on all articles on 
which there was a tax. This reduction was to approximate 20% 
34 Courier-Journal, Feb. 11, 1884 
betrayal of their party leaders in preference to their 
Republican masters. 35 It was obvious that the Democratic 
party was split, but at least Watterson and the reformists 
knew where they stood and who stood with them. Watterson 
30 
had some satisfaction nevertheless, for, as mentioned 
previously, he had shown hesitancy towards accepting the bill, 
and after its defeat he said, "In one respect the defeat of 
the Morrison Bill was a victory for revenue reform. The bill 
did not go half far enough. It failed to drive deep into the 
equality and morality of the question. It left untouched the 
abuses of the tariff. n36 
The chance for redemption seemed close at hand, for 
Watterson was very determined, in the next election, to bring 
the struggle for revenue reform to a triumphant conclusion. 
35 Oourier-Journa1, May 8, 1884 
36 Oourier-Journa1, May 14, 1884 
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The National Convention and the Democratic Platform 
of 1884. The defeat of the Morrison Bill did not, in any 
way, lessen the zeal of the tariff reformers. They at once 
prepared to carry their fight to the Democratic National 
Convention which met in the summer of 1884, at Chicago. 
Henry Watterson arrived early at Chicago with his tariff-
for-revenue-only plank, which he earnestly believed would 
be written into the Democratic platform. This confidence 
was undoubtedly viewed from the standpoint of Watterson's 
successes in the conventions of 1876 and 1880, in which he 
headed the Resolutions Committee and forced his pet idea into 
the platform. This success was not repeated however, for 
some of the more conservative Democrats opposed Watterson's 
measure. The two factions were so evenly divided that the 
ensuing battle made the 1884 convention one of the most 
stubborn and prolonged in the history of the conventions. 
The conservatives demanded a compromise because they were not 
yet convinced that the Southern demand for tariff reform was 
a wise issue upon which to face the country in the fall 
elections. 
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The resulting compromise platform at the Democratic 
Convention was definite assurance that neither protection 
nor free trade would be a major issue in the presidential 
campaign. It was obvious that too few people understood the 
tariff question to make it profitable campaign material. 
Both parties avoided specific promises, and their platform 
pledges were a bit confusing. The Republicans, as always, 
favored protection, but whether they meant high or low was 
left open to interpretation. Their plank read: 
A tariff not for revenue only, but to afford security 
to our diversified industries and protection to the 
rights and wages of the laborer ••••• by such methods 
as will relieve the taxpayers without injuring the 
laborer or the great productive interests of the country.l 
This was a very clever move by the Republicans; they apparently 
believed that the outcome of the election would depend 
primarily upon the tariff issue. The Democrats,on the other 
hand, promised to revise the tariff in a spirit of fairness, 
declaring that: 
Reduction in taxation can and must be effected without 
depriving American labor and without imposing lower rates 
of duty than will be ample to cover any increased cost of 
production which may exist in consequence of the higher 
rates of wages prevailing in this country.2 
A fe~ low tariff men like Morrison tried hard to interpret 
the Democratic plank as a possible tariff for revenue only, 
1 Denes Tilden Lynch, Grover Cleveland A Man Four Sq~are 
(New York: Horace Liveright, Inc. 1932), p. 225 --- ----
2 Ibid., p. 225 
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but Watterson openly disowned it as a straddle. 3 
The nomination of Grover Cleveland encouraged Watter-
son, for he knew well Cleveland's views on the subject of 
tariff reform. Cleveland's conservatism was no sham. It was 
the reflection of a logical mind which had weighed the tariff 
subject carefully and had seen the evils of the then existing 
war measure. Though Watterson was cool towards Cleveland 
before the nomination, he soon stepped to the front of the 
Democratic band wagon in his eagerness to swing the election 
in Cleveland's favor. He wrote: 
There can be no doubt in the mind of any observant 
man that the election of Grover Cleveland means the 
revision of the tariff. Democratic success means a 
radical revision of the tariff, or it has no meaning 
at all. The history of the party would force a re-
vision even if the leaders were reluctant. The industrial 
situation calls for measures of relief and relief, to 
be effective, to be permanent, must begin with a reform of 
the tariff. 4 
The election of Grover Cleveland in 1884 over Republi-
can Blaine supposedly proved to the Democrats that the country 
was well in accord with their views regarding tariff reform. 
A Democratic house with a Democratic speaker paved the way for 
immediate action on that important issue. In his inaugural 
address Cleveland touched lightly on the subject when he said: 
3 Allen Nevins, Grover Cleveland - A study in Courage 
(New York: Dodd Mead and do., 1932), p. l5~ --
4 Courier-Journal, sept. 8, 1884 
Our system of revenue shall be so adjusted as to 
relieve the people of unnecessary taxation, having a 
due regard to the interests of capital invested and 
workingmen employed in American industries, and pre-
venting the accumulation of a surplus in the treasury 
to tempt extravagance and waste. 5 
This conservatism was also reflected in Cleveland's first 
annual message delivered on December 8, 1885, when he said: 
The fact that our revenues are in excess of the 
actual needs of an economical administration justifies 
a reduction in the amount exacted from the people. Our 
government is but the means established by the will of 
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a free people; and its true spirit is never better 
observed than when the people's taxation for its support 
is scrupulously limited to the actual necessity of 
expenditure. The proposition with which we have to deal 
is the reduction of the revenue received by the govern-
ment and indirectly paid by the people, from customs 
duties. 6 
Cleveland's hesitancy in approaching the subject 
more forcefully was undoubtedly due to the new and strange 
feeling he felt towards his new office. His logical mind 
made him proceed slowly until he was better acquainted with 
the subject. The faction against reform was still too 
strong to be overcome by any decisive action so early in his 
career as president. His action on the tariff manifested 
itself later as newness gave way to experience, but, instead 
of proving a success for Cleveland and the Democratic party, 
it later brought about the return of Republicanism. Then 
5 Richardson, £E. cit., p. 4887 
6 Julius W. Muller, Presidential Messages and State 
Papers, (New York: The Review of Reviews Co., 19l7); 10 vols. 
pp. 2662-63 
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too, Cleveland's message was brief because of other issues 
which confronted him at the time and seemed to be of greater 
importance. 
In the year 1885-6 therefore nothing of great 
importance was accompolished by the so-called reform party. 
Watterson, throughout that year, led the attack against the 
Democratic protectionist block by strongly denouncing 
Representative Randall and his followers. Randall, who had 
previously committed himself to the protection of the 
industries of Pennsylvania, had been the greatest barrier the 
Reform Democrats had to hurdle. His control over a small 
group of Democrats, together with the vote of the Republican 
membership of the House, had thwarted reduction at every turn. 
Early in 1886 Watterson urged Morrison, who was again chair-
man of the Ways and Means Committee, to introduce a tariff 
reform bill which would justify the beliefs and demands of 
the Reformers. The new bill, as it was prepared by Morrison, 
was based on the principle of horizontal reduction as had 
been his previously defeated bill. Watterson was not alto-
gether satisfied with the bill from the standpoint of 
comprehensive tariff reform, but as a measure for the re-
duction of taxation, he agreed to support it. After it had 
been partially amended in the Committee, the bill was brought 
before the House for consideration. The protectionist block 
immediately gathered its forces and, when the bill came up 
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for vote, it was defeated by one hundred fifty-seven to one 
hundred forty.7 No further attempts were made at tariff 
redvction during that session of Congress, and in the en-
suing fall Morrison was defeated for re-election. 
The double blow dealt the Democratic party in 1886 
brought to them the realization that theirs was a struggle 
more difficult than any encountered up to this point. 
Watterson regarded the situation as a challenge to increased 
vigor in pushing the low tariff policy. He wrote, "The 
democracy has two enemies, the Republican party, unscrupulous, 
corrupt, and insatiable in its thirst for power and the tariff 
party, an army of mercenaries and monopolists, with a treasury 
filled by millions of dollars wrung remorselessly year by year 
from an over burdened overtaxed people. tl8 
The second annual message of President Cleveland, de-
livered December 6, 1886, proved to his followers that he had 
accepted the challenge and was eager to indicate his principles. 
Nothing that he had written or delivered previously on the 
tariff question was stronger or more pertinent, or better 
showed his knowledge of the subject. He said, tlWhen more 
7 Ford, op.clt., p.106 
8 Courier-Journal, November 4, 1886 
37 
o~ the people's substance is exacted through taxation than is 
necessary to meet the just obligations of the government and 
its economical administration, such exaction becomes ruthless 
extortion and a violation of the fundamentals of a ~ree 
government. fl9 
Cleveland and his annual message o~~. The year 
1886 went out like a lion for the tari~~ re~orm Democrats. 
Cleveland's 1886 message and Watterson's challenge to the 
protectionists offered great impetus to the Democratic party. 
Early in 1887 Speaker Carlisle was approached by the Courier-
Journal for a statement concerning the possibilities of tariff 
reform during that year. In his statement Carlisle expressed 
a great confidence that a tariff bill would be passed which 
would produce substantial reductions in the customs duties. 
The passage of the bill, however, would depend upon the vote 
of the Liberal Republican group, for, Randall still controlled 
the Democrat protectionist block and was very much against 
any lowering o~ the duties on imports. Reduction, neverthe-
less, was sure to come, ~or the large and growing surplus in 
the treasury made it necessary. The reduction in internal 
taxes, as previously suggested by the protectionists, was, as 
Carlisle put it, "an absurdity.ttlO He continued, "The 
9 Muller, ££. cit., p. 2705 
10 Courier-Journal, May 3, 1887 
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sentiment for a reduced tariff is growing steadily, 
especially in the Northwest. NOw, coupling this growing 
sentiment with an absolute necessity for reduction, I think 
it requires little power of political prophecy to assert, 
with confidence, that a reduction must come."ll 
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Randall and his followers recognized the growing heat 
of Cleveland's tariff reform ideas and felt sure that Cleve-
land would take a bold stand in his forthcoming annual 
message. Randall was silently gathering his forces in pre-
paration for such a move. On September 16, 1887, Cleveland 
was informed of Randall's activities by a letter from 
William Lawrence Scott. 12 Scott had previously discussed the 
tariff question with Randall; and in his letter to Cleveland, 
Scott warned the President that Randall was definitely not in 
accord with any reduction in the duties on imports, and that 
he, Randall, felt very sure that he could block and defeat any 
program set forth by the Reformers. 13 Numerous other sources 
were at work trying to urge the President to proceed along 
more cautious lines, for they too felt the growing strength 
of the industrial organizations. George Hoadly, in a letter 
11 Courier-Journal, May 3, 1887 
12 William Lawrence Scott (1828-91) an important in-
dustrialist and railroad builder of Erie, Pennsylvania and a 
firm believer in tariff reduction, was at this time a Represent-
ative. 
13 Allen Nevins, Letters of Grover Cleveland, Boston, New 
York, Houghton Mifflin Go., The RIverside Press Cambridge, 1933, 
p. 157 
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to Cleveland, earnestly urged the President to go slow; 
that both the manufacturers and the Knights of Labor were 
against him and that if Cleveland listened to the counsel 
of Watterson he would only convert the success he had so far 
accomplished, into defeat. 14 Cleveland, however, was not to 
be moved by any suggestions from his friends. He had made 
up his mind that a tariff in excess of the needs of the 
government was an ev~l, and his stern Presbyterianism 
refused a compromise. 
During the spring and summer of 1887 the surplus in 
the treasury grew to such large dimensions that it became 
evident that the prosperity and stability of the country were 
in danger. 15 Repeated conferences with the Secretary of the 
Treasury convinced Cleveland that relief was necessary and 
that relief could only be safely brought about by tariff re-
form. Cleveland, therefore, was determined to devote the 
whole of his annual message of 1887 to the discussion of the 
tariff question. 16 This was a novel experiment, for never 
in the United States history had a president limited his 
entire annual message to one topic. Carlisle was called in 
14 Allen, Ibid., p. 166, (Hoadly 1846-1902 was a 
prominent attorney and Democratic politician who had been 
Governor of Ohio 1884-85) 
15 George F. Parker, Recollections of Grover Cleveland 
(New York: The Century Company, 1932), p. I03 
16 Loc. cit. 
and day and night consultations were held between the 
President and the ~ormer Speaker. Cleveland's preparations 
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were heartily approved by Carlisle and very little change was 
made in the lengthy document. Cleveland's speech showed a 
knowledge of the subject and it is probable that no document 
of that type ever had had so wide a reading. It definitely 
showed the courage o~ Cleveland's opinion and made obvious 
the fact that he was willing to stake his political future 
upon the enunciation of his policy.17 His message had the 
effect o~ co~~itting his party unreservedly to the policy 
of direct opposition to the protective system and made this 
question a distinct party matter more so than it had been at 
any time since the Civil War. 18 
Cleveland's decision to stress the tari~f situation 
so emphatically brought new life to the Democrat Reformers. 
Watterson especially ~elt the tide of hope rising for, up 
to this time, he had, somewhat doubted Cleveland's intentions, 
and condemned the slowness of the introduction of tariff 
reform measures. 
On December 6, 1887, Cleveland delivered his third 
annual message to a jOint session. Nothing new concerning 
17 Parker, £2. cit., p. 104 
18 Taussig, OPe £!!., p. 253 
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the tariff question was introduced, but Cleveland presented a 
great preparation of facts based upon months of study. The 
main points of this famous message were: 
Our present tariff laws, the vicious, inequitable 
and illogical source of unnecessary taxation, ought to 
be at once revised and ammended. • • • The difficulty 
attending a wise and fair revision of our tariff laws 
is not underestimated. It will require on the part 
of the Congress great labor and care, and especially a 
broad and national contemplation of the subject and a 
patriotic disregard of such local and selfish claims as 
are unreasonable and reckless of the welfare of the 
entire country. 
Under our present laws more than four thousand 
articles are subject to duty • • • • A considerable 
reduction can be made in the aggregate by adding them 
to the free list. The taxation of luxuries presents no 
features of hardship; but the necessaries of life used 
and consumed by all the people, the duty upon which adds 
to the cost of living in every home, should be greatly 
cheapened. 19 
In answer to the Protectionists who branded the Re-
formers as free traders, Cleveland said: 
Our progress toward a wise conclusion will not be 
improved by dwelling upon the theories of protection and 
free trade •••• It is a condition which confronts us, 
not a theory •••• The question of free trade is abso-
lutely irrelevant and the persistent claim made in 
certain quarters that all the efforts to relieve the 
people from unjust and unnecessary taxation are schemes 
of the so-called free traders is mischievous and far 
removed from any consideration for the public good. 20 
Cleveland and the Mills Bill of 1888. As the year 
1888 opened, it was evident that the tariff question would 
19 Parker, £E. cit., pp. 5169, 5174 
20 Richardson, OPe cit., p. 5175 
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dominate all political discussion. Cleveland, in his message, 
had seen to that. Cleveland had directed his attack so defi-
nitely against the protective tariff that the Republicans 
were forced to champion it uncompromisingly. The tariff 
• question was not to be considered as a side issue any longer. 
So important were its issues, that it became one of the major 
planks in the platforms of both parties and the leading issue 
in the presidential campaigns of 1888 and 1892. Never in the 
history of the tariff question had the Democrats a better 
opportunity to push their ideas. The subject was placed be-
fore the people in no unyielding manner. That the reform 
would have to face barriers was eVident, for the Protection-
ists were equally obstinate in their opposition. Action was 
necessary in the production of tangible evidence which would 
show the true faith of the Reformers. Cleveland, realizing 
this necessity urged that his message be translated into a 
bill reducing the duties, especially upon raw materials and 
articles of general necessity. Representative Roger Q. Mills 
of Texas, who was then chairman of the Ways and Means Committee 
was called upon to frame the desired bill. The Mills Bill, 
was in no sense a free trade measure. Its primary object was 
to reduce the Civil War tariff and to relieve the taxpayer. 
It was prepared to reduce slightly the tax on clothing, 
blankets, carpets, kitchen and tableware, building materials, 
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etc. 21 The most important section of the bill however, was 
its free list of salt, lumber, and wool. Although Watterson 
felt that the bill did not fully meet with his principles of 
tariff reform, he half heartedly accepted it with these 
comments: 
It is highly protective, the tax rate it retains has 
been seldom equalled. To speak of a tariff bill which 
retains duties averaging forty-two per cent as free trade 
is folly, but high as the rate is, it is lower than that 
demanded by the Republicans. The Bill corrects some of 
the irregularities of the tariff; it adds some raw 
materials to the free list; it reduces the tariff on 
many necessaries of life but it does not give us free 
commerce with all nations; it does not inaugurate 
progressive free trade; it does not, with one enactment, 
reduce the tariff to a revenue basis.22 
The bill met great opposition in the House, but was 
finally passed on J~ly 21, 1888. 23 Immediately after the 
House vote, the bill was sent to the Senate to face the 
Republican majority. The woolen manufacturers who had 
shown the greatest opposition to the bill, had been preparing 
their forces while the bill was being debated in the House. 
The Republican members of the Senate were prevailed upon to 
block the bill presented to them by the House and this they 
did in no uncertain terms. The Senate immediately drafted 
their own bill, the object of which was to be so protective 
21 Courier-Journal, Aug. 19, 1888 
22 Courier-Journal, July 19,- August 2, 1888 
23 Ford, £E. ~., p. 125 
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in nature as to cause increased denunciation by the Democrats. 
With each house denouncing the other's bill tfThe deadlock 
prolonged itself, and at length faded out, as before a super-
imposed film, into the larger scene of the national election 
campaign.u24 
Up to the point of the introduction of the Mills Bill, 
it had been taken for granted that the re-election of Grover 
Cleveland was assured; but the opposition to Cleveland's 
ta.riff stand among manufacturers and other business men gave 
the Republicans new heart, and they prepared for a vigorous 
fight in the campaign of 1888. James P. Laster, president 
of the Republican League of the United States drew from the 
industrialists large sums of money for the campaign. Since 
the industrialists were being protected by suitable tariff 
laws, the Republican campaign managers felt that the money 
should pay.25 
The Election Campaign and the Democratic Convention 
of 1888. With the Mills Bill still pending in the Senate, 
the date arrived for the gathering of Democrats at the 
Democratic National Convention in St. Louis. 26 Watterson was 
convinced that a strong and convincing platform would 
24 Josephson, ££. cit., p. 404 
25 Tarbell, ~. cit., p. 177 
26 Barnes, 2£. cit., p. 140 
strike a telling blow at Protection. After five seconding 
speeches, a motion was made to nominate Cleveland by ac-
clamation, and this was accompolished without any definite 
protest from the Conservatives. The platform as introduced 
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by the Resolutions Committee, with Watterson as chairman was 
brief but to the point and, respecting the wishes of the 
PreSident, refrained from mentioning, in any way, the pending 
Mills Bill.27 Watterson, who had moved the adoption of the 
platform, announced that the committee had three small re-
solutions which were added to the platform, and these were 
accepted without discussion. The most important of these 
resolutions was: 
Resolved that this convention hereby indorses and 
recommends the early passage of the bill for the re-
duction of the revenue now pending in the House of 
Representatives. 28 
The drive for the re-election of Cleveland to the 
presidency was on, but the Democratic National Chairman, 
William H. Barnum and the Campaign Chairman, Calvin S. 
Brice, were at heart opposed to tariff reductions and put 
little energy into their fight. flAs a consequence, the 
November election resulted in a defeat for Cleveland, and 
William H. Harrison became the next President. _ Though the 
electoral vote was against him, Cleveland, received a 
popular plurality of some one hundred thousand votes and 
27 Lynch, OPe cit., p. 360-61 
28 Loc. Cit., p. 360 
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so the election gave no verdict against tariff reduction.,,29 
Cleveland's defeat staggered Watterson~ for he had 
placed his greatest hopes of tariff reform in the President 
and was not prepared to face the defeat of the Democratic 
party. Watterson was not resolved to go down in the struggle. 
He had accepted defeat so often that it was rather easy to 
take; however, defeat meant greater struggles, and Watterson 
expressed these feelings when he said, liThe defeat of Cleve-
land will be historiC; but it is not the end. It is but the 
beginning of the great battle for tariff reform. The cause 
suffers defeat today because the people are not ripe for it • 
• • • Today, in the face of disaster, the party is sounder 
of heart, cleaner of head, than a year ago, before the Presi-
dent called public attention to the necessity for reform in 
his message to Congress." 
"The work that lies before us is not to be done in 
one campaign but all the forces of intelligence, all the 
forces of invention, all the might,ypowers of labor, all the 
sacred rights of man are working in our behalf.,,30 
Cleveland, however, was not surprised when the defeat 
of 1888 came. He realized he had jeopardized his chances 
for re-election when he had delivered his annual message of 
29 Nevins, OPe cit., p. 169 
30 Courier-Journal, November 3, 1888 
1887 and now with defeat a reality there was only one thing 
left to do. ~hen preparing his last annual message for the 
meeting of Congress in December 1888, Cleveland again sent 
for Carlisle. Carlisle was thoroughly in accord with what 
the President had prepared as was Watterson who wrote: 
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The President, in his message to Congress ••• again 
urges upon that body, in all seriousness, the arguments 
for a reduction in the tariff. He deems this necessary 
because, under the laws as they stand today special 
priviledges have been granted to the rich and the power-
ful at the cost of the poor and many •••••••••• 
The President conveys to them the conviction of a most 
faithful executive officer who, from the beginning, has 
subordinated all party interests to what he deemed to be 
the general welfare, and who, above all other men in the 
country, has the right to address hbnself to all the 
people in an appeal for a better observation of the 
restrictions of the Constitution. 3l 
Cleveland did not hesitate in expounding his beliefs when 
he said: 
A just and sensible revision of our tariff laws 
should be made for the relief of those of our countrymen 
who suffer under present conditions ••••• The 
necessity of the reduction of our revenues is so 
apparent as to be generally conceded, but the means by 
which this end shall be accomplished and the sum of 
direct benefit which shall result to our citizens present 
a controversy of the utmost importance. There should be 
no scheme accepted as satisfactory by which the burdens 
of the people are only apparently removed. Extravagant 
appropriations of public money, with all their demoraliz-
ing consequence, should not be tolerated, either as a 
means of relieving the Treasury of its present surplus 
or as furnishing pretext for resisting a proper reduction 
in tariff rates. 32 
31 Courier-Journal, December 4, 1888 
32 Richardsons, £E. ~., p. 5361 
Election of Harrison and the influence of the tariff 
question. Harrison's ride to victory in the 1888 campaign 
was primarily due to the large contributions made and the 
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interest taken by the capitalists. Early in 1890 the promise 
made to the industrialists in the Republican platform was 
carried out when McKinley, who had become Chairman of the Ways 
and Means Committee, was called upon to draft a tariff law. 
The McKinley Tariff Bill which became a law on October 1, 
1890 was the most radical and revolutionary measure ever 
reported to congress. 33 A marked increase over the rates 
made in 1883 was evident and there was scarcely an article 
on the schedule which was not affected by the Bill. The wool 
and woolens schedule had been the most controversial point of 
the tariff issue and the changes made by the McKinley Tariff 
could not be overlooked. The duties on woolen cloths were 
established as fixed rates by the tariff of 1867 while in 
1883 they were changed to ad valorem. 34 The tariff of 1890 
advanced these rates still further. A comparison of rates 
set by the tariffs of 1883 and 1890 may be made by giving a 
few items. 35 
33 Ford, OPe cit., p. 162 
34 Reference can be made to a chart in the preceding 
chapter which shows the comparable rates established by the 
1867 and 1883 tariffs. 
35 Taussig, OPe cit., p. 260 
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DUTIES ON WOOLEN GOODS 
In 1883 
1. If worth $.80 or less per 
pound Duty: ~;.35 a pound 
plus 35%. [Approximate duty 
85<Jf} 
2. If worth more than $.80 
a pound Dut~: $.35 a pound 
plus 40%. LAPproximate duty 
85;9 
In 1890 
1. If worth $.30 or less per 
pound Duty: $.33 a pound plus 
40%. [Approxima te duty 100%] 
2. If worth between $.30 and 
$.40 per pound Dua= $38~ a pound plus 40%. pproximate duties 125 to 170 
3. If worth more than $.40 a 
pound Duty: $.44 a pound plus 
50%. f!..pproximate duty 160~ 
The comparison of duties on the above mentioned items shows 
that the tariff of 1890 was approximately twice as high as 
that of 1883. 
DUTIES ON DRESS GOODS 
In 1883 
1. Cotton warp worth $.20 a 
yard or less Duty: $.05 a 
yard plus 35%:n [APprox-
imate duty 6070J 
2. Cotton warp worth over 
$.20 Duty: $.07 a yard plus 40%. 
[Approximate duty 70~ 
3. Warp made wholly of wool 
Duty: :]p.09 a yard plus 40;&'. 
[Approximate duty 85%J 
In 1890 
1. Cotton warp worth $.15 a 
yard or less Duty $.07 a yard 
plus 40%. [Approxima te duty 
90?f] 
2. Cotton warp worth over 
$.15 a yard Duty: $.08 a yard 
plus 50%. [Approximate duty 
105J0 
3. If warp contains any wool 
Duty: $.12 a yard plu~ 50lb. 
~pproximate duty l30~ 
The general rise in duty on these items by the tariff of 1890 
amounted to approximately thirty-seven per cent. 
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To appease the farmers, the duties were placed on 
various farm products but these could have little farm effect 
on raising the prices because these products were very largely 
sold in Europe. In order to reduce the surplus, which was 
always a point of contention in tariff legislation, the duty 
on sugar was removed and instead sugar growers were paid a 
bounty of two cents a pound. "As a whole, the tariff act of 
1890 presented to the American people without disguise the' 
question whether they wished a larger extension of the pro-
tective system beyond the pOint to which it had developed by 
l/ legislation of the war period. 36 
The Democratic reaction to the McKinley Bill was like 
a volcanic eruption. Protest from the Reformers came fast 
and vigorous but the Republican majority held firm. Watter-
son condemmed the bill in his editorials in no unyielding 
terms point for pOint, as follows;37 
1. It is a monument of legislative iniquity, a job 
from beginning to end, a robbery in every line. 
2. It is a violation of every conception of equality 
and justice. 
3. It is a defiance of every sound principle of 
political economy. 
4. It takes from him that hath not, all that he hath, 
and gives to him who hath more than he knows what to do 
with. 
36 Swisher, £Eo cit., p. 25 
37 Courier-Journal, September 27, 1890 
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5. It plunders the poor for the benefit of the rich, 
and robs the farmer that the manufacturer may roll in 
wealth. 
6. It takes the products of the western producer, and 
hands him over bound hand and foot to the eastern 
plunderer. 
7. It sacrifices the South to the West and then 
sacrifices the West to the East. 
8. It is the concentration of twenty-five 
unpunished crL~e and is another evidence that 
sentence against an evil work is not executed 




Watterson felt that the high rates and favoritism for 
party groups would create a tide of retaliation and condem-
nation toward the Republican party. He realized that, to 
start agitation now was not to soon even though the next 
presidential election was still far off and in this respect 
he said: 
The Democrats to win in 1892, must begin the fight 
now. It must be continued from this day on to the close 
without yielding an inch at any point; without compromise 
or conciliation - fighting as earnestly and persistently 
in '90, '91, '92 as in '88 for lower taxes for the people 
and free raw materials for the manufacturers .38 
The previous election had disrupted the Democratic party and 
it would take time to rebuild it on the basis of the old 
tariff reform ideas. The results of this strategic planning 
were shown in the campaign and national convention of 1892. 
38 Courier-Journal, September 12, 1890 
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CLEVELM~D AGAIN AND THE FAILURE OF TARIFF REFORM 
CHAPTER IV 
CLEVELAND AGAIN AND THE FAILURE OF TARIFF REFORM 
The Democratic Campaign and the National Convention 
of 1892. The McKinley Bill with its high protection policy 
and discriminating principles was the basis of attack of 
the reformers in their struggle to overthrow the Republicans 
in the next election. Granting protection to the agri-
cultural group under the McKinley Tariff seemed to be the 
proper move for the protectionists for, by dOing so, they 
felt that they would be able to swing the farmer away from 
the free trade block. But agrarian dissatisfaction brought 
on a movement known as Populism, resulting in the formation 
of a "Peoples Party", as a direct protest against the acts 
of the party in power. It was evident that Harrison's greed 
and extravagance were working against him and the Republican 
party. Some of this extravagance was brought about by the 
promises the "Republican party had made to every wing and 
section. To the industrial capitalist of the East a high 
protective tariff was pledged. To rural sections the 
party had made appeal by hinting in its platform at a re-
newal of silver-money inflB.tion. To the war veterans, 
angered by Cleveland's vetoes of pension bills, Harrison 
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promised an annuity for all who were unable to earn a living. til 
The Democrats helped this decline by their criticism of the 
large appropriations passed by the "billion-dollar" Hepubli-
can Congress in order to reduce the large and growing 
treasury surplus. This, and other discriminating principles, 
brought about a higher cost of living. The steady rise in 
prices and the decline of the purchasing power of the dollar 
caused great agitation in the agricultural west. Many city 
people attributed the increased cost of living to the high 
rates of tariff, and in the election of 1890 gave the 
Democratic party a majority in both the House and the Senate. 
Watterson had been continually preparing his party 
for the coming presidential election in 1892, and the 
Democratic success of 1890 offered much encouragement to him 
and hi s followers. Democre.tic strength wasn't sufficient 
enough however, to force the issue. A more propitious 
moment was necessary and this, Watterson felt, would arrive 
following the election of 1892. 
The Democratic National Convention of 1892 was held 
in Chicago, and Watterson went prepared for the fight of his 
life. Once more, as in 1888, there was a prolonged struggle 
in the platform conwittee over the tariff plank. Cleveland 
was the obvious and inevitable candidate, but he came to the 
1 Josephson, OPe cit., pp. 434-35 
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convention with a more cautious attitude concerning tariff 
reform. 2 William C. Vi~itney, Cleveland's first term manager 
and William F. Vila.s, his ex-Postmaster Genera13 "brought 
forth the same pla.nk which had been used in the campaign 
of 1884 which declared for a revision of the tariff laws to 
remove their inequalities, lighten their oppressions, and 
put them on a fair basis.,,4 This was acceptable to Cleveland, 
but Watterson vigorously protested the proposal. The defeat 
of Watterson and Thomas L. Johnson in the Resolutions 
Committee did not daunt these radicals in the least. They 
carried their fight to the floor and by their tactics and 
eloquence, had substituted a plank which denounced "Republican 
protection in general as fraud and robbery, called the 
McKinley Act the culminating atrocity of class legislation 
and declared high tariff-taxation unconstitutional."5 Their 
substi tuted pls.nk declared for a tariff for revenue only, 
in no uncertain terms.6 The slight differences of opinion 
which had ensued between Watterson and Clevels.nd as far back 
as 1888 now broke out anew and in more violent measures. 
2 Nevins, OPe cit., p. 491 
3 Josephson, £E. cit., p. 495 
4 Nevins, OPe cit., p. 491 
5 Ibid., p. 491 
6 Louisville Times, Dec. 23, 1921, Louisville, Ky. 
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Cleveland's discontent over the Watterson tariff plank showed 
no bounds, and he immediately dispatched a modest but 
to-the-point letter to the Louisville Editor giving his 
reasons for favoring caution, even going so far as threatenimg 
to modify if not repudiate the plank in his letter of 
acceptance. Watterson showed his firm stand on the subject 
when, in a letter to Cleveland, he wrote: 
I had at St. Louis in 1888 and at Chicago the 
present year to oppose what was represented as your judgement and desire in the adoption of a tariff plank 
in our National platform • • • • The enclosed articles 
set forth the reasons forcing upon me a different 
conclusion from yours, in terms that may appear to you 
bluntly specific but I hope not personally offensive. • 
••• I do not think that you appreciate the over-
whelming force of the revenue reform issue, which has 
made you its idol. If you will allow me to say so, in 
perfect frankness and without intending to be rude or 
unkind, the gentlemen immediately about you, gentlemen 
upon whom you rely for material aid and energetic party 
management are not as to the tariff, Democrats at all, 
and have little conception of the place in the popular 
mind and heart held by the Revenue Reform idea, or, 
indeed of any idea except that of organization and 
money ••••• You cannot escape your great message of 
1887 if you would. I know it by heart and I think that 
I perfectly apprehend its scope and tenor. Take it as 
your guiding star, stand upon it, reiterate it, emphasize 
it, amplify it, but do not subtract a thought, do not 
erase a word. 7 
Cleveland did not accept this letter in the manner 
Watterson had anticipated. The ex-President's firmness of 
mind showed itself only too well. He immediately answered 
Watterson in terms so sharp and drastic that these two men 
7 Letter from Henry Watterson to Grover Cleveland 
July 9, 1892, Courier-Journal Office, Louisville, Kentucky 
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became bitter enemies and remained so until death. 
The election of Cleveland and his attempts at tariff 
reform. The greed and extravagance of the Harrison adminis-
tration put the United States in a very precarious position. 
Business conditions became unsatisfactory early in 1890 
when the failure of many banks in England and her colonies 
greatly influenced the conditions in this country. India 
and' many countries in Europe which had established the Gold 
Standard purchased bullion from the United states to increase 
their gold reserve. American exports declined and the United 
states began shipping gold to Europe in settlement of her 
trade balances. As a result the gold supply became increas-
ingly low. Unemployment spread. The dissatisfaction of the 
people concerning these conditions manifested itself in the 
election of 1892 when Cleveland was returned to the ~~ite 
House, backed by a Democratic majority in both houses. 
Cleveland was inaugurated on March 4, 1893, and in 
his brief inaugural address he promised a sound and stable 
currency, Civil Service reform and tariff reduction. 
Concerning the tariff he said: 
The people of the United States have decreed that 
on this day the control of their government in its 
legislative and executive branches shall be given to a 
political party pledged in the most positive terms to 
the accomplishment of tariff reform. • • • • • • • • • 
They have thus determined in favor of a more just and 
equitable system of Federal taxation. The agents 
they have chosen to carry out their purposes are bound 
by the promises not less than by the command of their 
masters to devote themselves unremittingly to this 
service. 8 
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The beginning of the second presidential term 
presented two important problems to Cleveland. He was faced 
with a demand from two quarters for a special session of 
Congress. The tariff reform radicals wanted immediate 
action on their subject and urged Cleveland to call the 
session for them. Another group demanded the special 
session in order to repeal the Silver-Purchase Act and thus 
avert the worst consequence of a panic. According to this 
law silver was being purchased with treasury notes which 
were redeemable in gold or silver. Since the holders 
demanded gold, the gold supply was fast being reduced. Many 
people feared that the government would be forced to abandon 
the gold standard, and this they believed, would destroy the 
monetary and banking system. Cleveland believed that prompt 
action on this subject was necessary, but to set aside, even 
temporarily, the tariff question, his pet policy, was 
definitely hard to do. After some hesitation, however, he 
finally decided to call Congress to repeal the Silver-
Purchase Act. By doing thiS, the President sacrificed his 
best chance of obtaining that full and satisfactory revision 
of the tariff for which he had so long argued. Watterson and 
his followers were much disturbed by the President's action. 
8 Renzo D. Bowers, Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents 
(St. Louis, Mo: Thomas Law Book Company, 1929 )-,-p:3'30 
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Their defeat, they felt, was not justifiable in the light of 
what they had previously accomplished for the party. 
Cleveland's decision only added to the enmity that already 
existed between the President and the Louisville editor. 
Although Watterson favored silver-purchase repeal many 
other Democrats opposed it and the repeal bill was passed 
largely by Republican votes. 
The Wilson-Gorman Tariff. ~~en the regular session 
of Congress met in December, 1893, Cleveland attempted to 
cover up his previous side-stepping of the tariff question 
by demanding from Congress immediate action for reduction. 
The President was well armed in his fight against protection, 
for William L. Wilson, of West Virginia, a staunch advocate 
of tariff reform was appointed chairman of the Vlays and Means 
Committee. Carlisle, the former Speaker of the House and 
an ardent tariff reformer was made Secretary of the Treasury.9 
For approximately six months, in which Cleveland said very 
little concerning tariff reduction, he had been working 
diligently with Wilson, to draft a suitable tariff bill. 
Cleveland knew what he wanted, and in these behind-the-door 
conferences he outlined his policies carefully. These he 
expressed in his message as follows: 
Manifestly if we are to aid the people directly 
9 Barnes, ££. cit., p. 204 
through tariff reform, one of its most obvious features 
should be a reduction in the present tariff charges 
upon the necessaries of life. The benefits of such a 
reduction would be palpable and substantial, seen and 
felt by thousands who would be better fed and better 
clothed and better sheltered. These gifts should be 
the willing benefactions of a Government whose highest 
function is the promotion of the welfare of the people. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
A measure has been prepared by the appropriate 
Congressional committee embodying tariff reform on the 
lines herein suggested, which will be promptly sub-
mitted for legislative action. IO 
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Watterson had been watChing the Wilson - Cleveland proceedings 
carefully and had repeatedly challanged Cleveland to abide 
by the Democratic promises as set forth in the party platform. 
If Cleveland's previous opposition to Watterson's insistent 
tariff reduction demands were reflected in the aforementioned 
tariff reform bill, this would mean the loss of everything 
that had been gained by the tariff reform Democrats in the 
National Convention. The National Democratic platform, as 
Watterson put it, was the chart for the President to consult, 
and broken pledges could only bring about broken hopes. ll 
While the bill was being prepared by Wilson and his 
House Committee, the Republican Protectionist block in the 
Senate was busy spreading its propaganda against the bill. 
10 Albert Ellery Bergh, Letters and Address of 
Grover Cleveland (New York: The Unit Bo~Publlshlng-Company, 
1909), pp. 360-362. 
11 Courier-Journal, Mar. 6, 1894 
Eastern capitalists prepared petitions which they sent to 
Washington to be used against the repeal of the McKinley 
Tariff. Factory owners in the East even went So far as to 
threaten their employees with dismissal if they tried, even 
in some small way, to help the reformers. The bill as 
presented to the House in January, 1894 worked towards free 
raw materials, a general reduction of other tariff duties 
and a change from specific to advalorem rates. Watterson's 
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fears were partly justified, for the Wilson Bill retained 
some protective features of the McKinley Tariff. Wilson, 
too, realized the protective qualities of the bill, for he 
remarked that if there would be any objection to the bill it 
would be because it made rates too high rather than too low. 
Watterson and his reformers realized that the bill fell far 
short of what was desired and expected by the tariff reform 
sentiment of the country. In his modified acceptance of the 
Bill, Watterson said: 
The Wilson Bill, in all candor, is certainly the 
least that the Democrats could offer as a redemption 
of their pledge to give the country a revenue tariff. 
It is unsatisfactory to thorough-going tariff reformers 
because, while its constructors claim to have formed 
it on revenue lines, its provisions show that it was 
formed with never a loss of sight of protection lines 
also. But the tariff reformers are ready to swallow 
their disappointment and take the Wilson Bill as a 
half loaf. 12 
12 Courier-Journal, March 9, 1894 
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The large majority or Democrats in the House paved 
the way ror quick passage or the Bill. This in itselr was 
some satisraction to Watterson, ror it disposed of the 
taunting Republican assertion that the Democratic Party was 
too much torn by ractions to make headway in the rerorm or 
tarirf. rr the step towards tarirf rerorm was not as long 
a stride as the Courier-Journal had hoped, at least almost 
the entire party took it together. On February 1, the bill 
passed the House and was sent to the Senate. "The Wilson 
Bill had seemed a paltry enough gesture at tarifr reform 
but now the senate Finance Committee of which the Maryland 
boss (Arthur Gorman) was a member got to work behind its 
closed doors improvising hundreds of amendments - in all 634 
which left but a rew shreds or the original bill as framed 
in the House. fI 13 
The appeasement or individual factions by the Senate 
was necessary, ror large sums of money had been constantly 
pouring into the pockets of the doubtful senators. 
Lobbyists were busy at their appointed task and filibustering 
was the event of the session ror the Senate wanted to gain 
back, by delay, every possible spark of protection they felt 
had been taken away from them by Wilson's offering. The free 
list of wool, coal, iron ore, and sugar was attacked most 
13 Josephson, OPe cit.-, p. 544 
heavily. Gorman, in order to satisfy his own state and 
others, replaced the duty on coal, though not at the high 
level established by the MCKinley tariff. Iron ore again 
received its bounty for the benefit of the Alabama senators 
and the 'Sugar Trust was able to retain its protection. 
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So great was the mutilation of the Wilson Bill that 
the House indignantly rejected the ammendments. Cleveland's 
bitterness toward Gorman and the Finance Committee left no 
doubt as to the feelings between the President and the 
Senator from Maryland, but the die had been cast and it was 
now up to the House to attempt to salvage the parts. 
Cleveland dispatched a letter to Wilson on July 2, 1894, in 
which he expressed his true feelings of the Senate attack by 
saying in part: 
The certainty that a conference will be ordered 
between the two houses of Congress for the purpose of 
adjusting differences on the subject of the tariff 
legislation makes it also certain that you will again 
be called on to do hard service in the cause of tariff 
reform. Every true Democrat and every sincere tariff 
reformer knows that this bill in its present form and 
as it will be submitted to the conference falls far 
short of the consilllli~ation for which we have long labored, 
for which we have suffered defeat without discouragement, 
which, .:. in its anticipation gave us a rallying cry in 
our day of triumph, and which, in its promise of 
accomplishment is so interwoven with Democratic pledges 
and Democratic success that our abandonment of the 
cause of the principles upon which it rests means party 
perfidy and party dishonor.14 
14 Nevins, Ope ~., pp. 354, 355 
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The necessity for a conference committee to be called 
was obvious, for the House stood out stubbornly against the 
surrender which the Senate demanded. Montgomery and Wilson, 
two of the most radical reformers on the conference cOmL1ittee, 
insisted on the po1Ioy of free coal, Iron, and sugar as they 
had been provided in the Wilson Bill. Oddly enough, free wool 
had escaped the general wreck of the Democratic pledges which 
the Finance Committee had accomplished. This could be set 
down, as Watterson put it, "as the eighth wonder of the wor1d. fl15 
Watterson, to be sure, was very much disgusted with the legis-
lative proceedings. The bill, as Wilson had drafted it was so 
protective in nature that it was barely tariff reform, in 
Watterson's opinion. Gorman's revision left not enough tariff 
reform in the bill to make it worth fighting for. In fact 
Watterson felt that the Wilson-Gorman Bill was such close kin 
to the McKinley Measure that he couldn't see why the Republi-
cans wanted to fight against it. 16 
For one whole month the Senate and the House fought 
bitterly in their struggles over the tariff question. The 
House Democrats tried to get back that which they previously 
had gained in their own chamber while the Senators fought for 
the protectionist features added to the House bill. One of 
15 Courier-Journal, May 9, 1894 
16 Courier-Journal, May 26, 1894 
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the greatest controversies between the chambers resulted rrom 
divergent policies on sugar. The House had provided that 
sugar be made duty rree, but the Sugar Trust, through their 
lobbists and large amounts or capital, had managed to keep 
themselves well protected by having that item on the rree 
list removed, and a suitable duty on sugar substituted. For 
example, the Tarirr Bill as it passed the Senate provided 
that all sugar should pay, a duty or rorty per cent ad 
valorem, which meant that domestic sugar growers in Louisiana 
and elsewhere were protected against Cuban and other imports. 
The bill rurther provided that on all sugar above number 
sixteen Dutch Standard there should be levied and paid a duty 
or one eighth or a cent a pound in addition to the said 
rorty per cent ad valorem. 17 This dirferential tax protected 
sugar refineries which were almost all ovmed by the American 
Sugar Company (a new name adopted by the former Sugar Trust). 
Some tariff reformers had previously advocated a low duty on 
raw sugar, since most or the revenue would enter the United 
States Treasury. Cleveland, in his letter to William L. 
Wilson had advocated a tax on sugar but only within reason-
able bounds and of such a nature as not to run counter to the 
Democratic principle.18 On this subject Vfuitney, Cleveland's 
17 Sugar above No. 16 Dutch Standard was known as 
refined sugar: below that as raw sugar. 
18 Nevins, OPe cit., p. 357 
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backer showed favoritism to the Sugar Trust by showing them 
the open door to the President t s office. V'fuen the Sugar 
Barons, Henry and Theodore Havemeyer wanted a personal inter-
view with the President, Whitney sent them to the "Assistant 
President" Daniel Lamont who was taking orders from Yfui tney .19 
Since approximately nine-tenths of the sugar consumed in the 
United States came from abroad, that proportion of the tariff 
revenue would find its way in the United States Treasury. 
The Senate Bill however, deviated from the purely revenue 
basis and placed the tax so high that importations were 
practically impossible. The Differential Tax gave the 
domestic refineries or Sugar Trusts the additional margin of 
one eighth of B_ cent a pound so that they could raise the 
price of their sugar that much more without subjecting them-
selves to competition from abroad. Watterson termed the 
privilege as ua pure gift to the Sugar Trust.,,20 
Protests from the Lower House were of no avail, for 
the Senate refused to budge an inch. Wilson, in a speech to 
both Houses, presented the letter which he had received from 
Cleveland concerning the "Mongrel Bill," hoping that it would 
have some influence upon the stubborn Democrat Protectionists, 
19 Josephson, 2£. cit., pp. 546-47 
20 Courier-Journal, August 1, 1894 
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but that was not to be the case. The Senate Democrats, Garman, 
Brice, Chaffery s.nd others, felt that they hadn't broken any 
party pledges; and their anger toward such insinuations re-
sulted in their firm stand on Democratic conservatism. 
The session of Congress was soon to terminate, and 
seeing the possibility of having no bill at all, the House 
decided to acquiese. Wilson, in his last speech to the 
Conference Committee, expressed his feelings on the situation 
quite frankly: til can't pretend that I am gratified at the 
outcome of this prolonged controversy ••••• We realized 
in this fight • • • that when the people have gained a victory 
at the polls they must have a further stand-up and knock-down 
fight with their own representatives. u2l 
Watterson carried the torch also, and his bitter 
feelings toward the Democrats and their failure to carry 
their measure were expressed in his Qourier-Journal editorial 
of M.arch 9, 1894, in which he wrote: 
Every honest Democrat in the land must feel humiliated 
and sick at heart over the spectacle of a Democrs.tic 
Senate abandoning itself to a wild pl'otectionist orgie, 
without a thought of broken pledge and dishonored plat-
form. No voice is raised in all that din of conflicting 
interests to demand a hearing for the party's promises. 
The affair ls.cks even the dignity of a contest between 
protection and tariff reform. Tariff reform is no 
longer in the fight. 
The Wilson-Gorman Tariff embodying those concessions 
21 Courier-Journal, August 14, 1894 
67 
of Senatorial greed went to the President for his signature. 
The members of both Houses had hoped that the President would 
apply his pen at once for that session of Congress was soon 
to be over and the members were anxious to return to their 
homes. Numerous tariff reformers earnestly urged Cleveland 
to sign the bill, for they felt that if he did not do so he 
would hurt the chances of the Democratic party in the next 
election. It was suggested to Cleveland that what the Bill 
represented was all that the true friends of the President 
could get, and, consequently, if Cleveland refused to apply 
his signature to the bill it would signify his abdication of 
leadership of the Democratic Party. Cleveland could not see 
the results of his refusal in that light. He had previously 
denounced the bill in a scathing letter and if he had signed 
it it would have shown only a reversal of his attitude, yet 
he would not veto it; because it made some reductions. The 
only possible path to follow, the President took, and the 
Bill became a law on August 27, 1894, without his signature. 22 
Up to the time of the final passage of the bill the tariff 
reformers could only see its bad clauses, but when the 
measure became a law, the few concessions that had been granted 
to the reformers were emphasized. In the first place, the 
Senate had suggested the possibility of introducing individual 
22 Tarbell, ££. ~., p. 236 
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tariff laws on those items which the House had place on the 
free list but on which the Senate had demanded duties. These 
pop-gun tariff bills, as they had become known, were the first 
things the House decided to consider when the next session of 
Congress was to convene in December, 1894. 
Of those items which the lower chamber had placed on 
the free list in the original Wilson Bill, wool was the only 
item which had remained untouched by the Senate. This had 
been interpreted by the tariff reformers, as an oversight. 
Concerning this provision, Watterson said: 
The best thing in the new bill, from the people's 
standpoint, is free wool and cheaper woolen clothing. 
In fact, free wool is about the only thing in the bill 
to be proud of. By some sort of good luck free wool 
escaped the greedy eyes of the conservative Senators 
and was left in the bill as a lonesome reminder of 
what might have been. • • • The reductions on woolen 
goods will make a marked difference in the cost of 
woolen clothing, shawls, yarns, blankets and flannels. 
The McKinley Bill taxed woolen yarns something like 
two hundred seventy-nine per cent of their value, the 
new bill taxes them about thirty per cent. Woolen 
shawls are cut from about one hundred fifty per cent to 
thirty-five percent and other woolens in about the 
same proportion. 23 
It was clear that the Wilson-Gorman Tariff made no 
deep-reaching change in the precious tariff legislation. 
Aside from free wool and a few cuts here and there in the 
general duties, the bill remained definitely protective in 
nature. 
23 Courier-Journal, August 18, 1894 
The defeat of the Democrats in 1894 and '96 and the 
election of President McKinley. Approximately two months 
after the passage of the Wilson-Gorman Tariff the Democrats 
suffered a defeat in the Congressional election. The in-
dustrial failure and general panic in the country during 
Cleveland's administration was interpreted as a Democratic 
weakness and, as a consequence, the people rallied to the 
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Republican cause. The pop-gun tariff bills which the tariff 
reformers were trying to push through Congress were forgotten, 
since some of the Democratic leaders who had desired them had 
been unseated in Congress. The Presidential election of 1896 
met with the sarne Republican success. William McKinley, on 
the platform of protection and the gold standard, faced 
Mr. William Jennings Bryan, who ran on the platform of free 
silver and tariff reduction. 24 The tariff question was the 
second policy of the Democrats; they promised they would 
institute tariff legislation at the first opportunity. 
Watterson, who had previously been a very influential 
spokesman for the Democratic nominees during many presidential 
elections, lost all interest in the fight, and went on a 
vac8.tion abroad during the campaign. Mr. Haldeman, Watterson's 
24 The gold and silver plank could be read in 
different ways. McKinley favored International Silver 
agreement but this had already been proved impossible. 
• 
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partner, put the Courier-Journal on the stand when he announced 
that the Louisville paper would oppose the Democratic nominee 
on the free silver issue. Watterson, on hearing this, Ulliledi-
ately cabled his partner and backed Haldeman's opinion with 
these words, "No compromise with dishonor."25 Though the 
paper met with much criticism, it didn't hesitate to pull any 
punches aimed at Bryan. 
The campaign was fast and furious but the outcome soon 
became apparent. Those who had shouted loudest for the 
Democratic nominee realized that they couldn't vote for him. 
The vote of the gold Democrats split the Democrats in Kentucky 
and other border states and the Republicans swept into office 
and into control of the government for the next sixteen 
years. Although the campaign was fought on the basis of 
sound money that policy was far from McKinley's mind when he 
took office. Wben McKinley was inaugurated, he made known 
his intentions concerning the tariff: 
In the revision of the tariff, especial attention 
should be given to the reenactment and extension of the 
reciprocity principle of the law of 1890, under which 
so great a stimulus was given to our foreign trade in 
new and advantageous markets for our surplus agri-
cultural and manufactured products. The brief trial 
given this legislation amply justifies a further 
experiment and additional discretionary power in the 
making of commercial treaties, the end in view always 
to be the opening up of new markets for the products of 
our country, by granting concessions to the products 
25 Courier-Journal, July 13, 1896 
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of other lands that we need and cannot produce ourselves, 
and which do not involve any loss of labor to our own 
people, but tend to increase their employment.26 
A special session of Congress was called and the 
President requested Congress to deal solely with the import 
duties and the revenue. It may be remembered that when 
Cleveland became President following Harrison's administration 
the treasury showed a deficit of $70,000,000, and this 
amount had not been recovered during the four years of 
Democratic rule, partly because the income tax had been 
annulled" hy the Supreme Court. A measure of relief for the 
Treasury was necessary, and Representative Dingley, the 
chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, was called upon 
for immediate action on that subject. Previous preparations 
had been made in contemplation of such a demand, and soon a 
tariff bill was presented to the House for a vote. The 
Dingley Tariff, as the bill became known, passed the House 
with great speed, but did not meet with such success in the 
Senate. For two months the Senate studied the bill item for 
item and amended it considerably by lowering some of the rates 
which were introduced by the House. This action necessitated 
the calling of a conference comrnittee in order that both 
Houses could discuss the changed bill. Those items which 
26 Richardson, OPe cit., Vol. 13, p. 6239 
were revised by the Senate were rechanged by the House and 
the bill, in that condition, was passed by the President on 
July 24, 1897. The strength of the tariff reformers had 
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waned and Watterson portrayed purely passive interest in the 
new tariff legislation. he had recognized the biLi and had 
followed its procedure through both houses of Congress. His 
previous policy would have caused him to condemn the new 
tariff law, but he remained silent concerning the new pro-
tective measure. 
The Dingley Tariff, was designed to give protection to 
domestic industries and also to bring the treasury a much 
needed increase of revenue. TWo of the major points brought 
out in the tariff of 1897 were: 
1. The removal of wool from the free list. 
2. The return of the reciprocity clause as had 
previously been established by the McKinley Bill of 1890. 27 
Wool had previously been established as a free item 
by the Wilson-Gorman Tariff but again it was placed on the 
duty list however with a few minor changes. The change in 
the duty on wool naturally meant a change in the duties on 
cloths. The comparison between the Republican bills on this 
subject is as follows: 
27 The so called reciprocity clause gave the President 
the prlviledge of suspending the free admission of certain 
specified articles if he were satisfied that other countries 
imposed duties that were unreasonable and unequal. Taussig, 
~. ~., p.353 
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DUTIES ON WOOLEN CLOTHS 
1890 
1. If worth $.30 or less per 
pound, $.33 per poundj>lus 40/~. 
{Approximate duty 150%J 
2. If worth betw~en ~.30 and 
$.40 per pound, ~.382 per 
pound plus 40%. lILAPproxima te 
duty 137 to 160~ 
3. If worth more than $.40 
per pound, $.44 per pound plus 
50%. [APproximate duty 160%j 
1897 
1. If worth $.40 or less per 
pound, $.33 per pound plus 
50;h. [fo,pproximate duty 100f&] 
2. If worth between $.40 and 
$.70 per pound $.44 per pound 
plus 50%. ~pproximate duty 
125 to 160~i1 
3. If worth over $.70 per 
pound, $.44 per pound plus 
55%. [Approxima te duty 125 %J 
DUTIES ON DRESS GOODS 
1890 
1. Cotton warPl worth $.15 a 
yard or less, 1i?07 a yard 
plus 4016. [Approximate duty 
95%J 
1897 
1. and 2. The same; but with 
the proviso that the ad 
valorem duty shall be 55% if 
the value is over $.70 per 
pound. [Approximate duty 65% 
2. Cotton warp wor~h more to 85%] 
than $.15 a yard, ~.08 a yard 
plus 5076. (APproximate duty 100%J 
3. If the warp has any wool, 
$.12 a yard plus 50%. 
[Approximate duty 125i/ 
3. If the warp has any wool, 
$.11 per yard plus 50%,; but 
with the proviso that the ad 
valorem duty shall be 55% if 
the value exceeds $.70 per 
pound. 28 [li,pproximate duty 
70 to l15~D 
The Dingley Tariff lived through an era of prosperity 
and industrial activity to become longer lived than any of 
its preceeding measures. The twelve years of its existence 
came to an end by the party of its making. 
28 Taussig, Ibid., pp. 333-34 
SUM~llARY AND CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
I have presented two major issues: 1. The tariff 
policy of the nation from the standpoint of protection and 
reform or Republicanism and Democratic rule. 2. The tariff 
policy of Henry Watterson and its effect upon party politics; 
also its relation to that tariff legislation which was put 
into operation. 
I have shown how tariff reform and hi~~ tariff 
became the policies of the two major parties in this country, 
the Republicans and the Democrats. The twenty year period 
of strife which was covered in this work brought out this 
fairly definite issue between the parties and made it the 
leading topic of controversy most of those twenty years. 
The highest public office sought, that of the presidency of 
the United States, was won and lost on this issue during 
the elections of 188~ and 1892. The supposed effects of 
such legislation were discussed freely. 
The tariff-for-revenue-only theory found its 
strength in the hands of the Democrat Tariff Reform group 
who justified their desire for tariff reduction on two 
major pOints: 1. The Constitution authorized a duty on 
imported goods sufficient only to supply the treasury of 
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the United States with the necessary operational income. The 
lowering or removing of duties on those articles which were 
most necessary would give consumers more reasonable prices. 
The protectionist theory was guided by the manufac-
turers or big business men of the country who asked for, 
protection from competition from foreign manufacturers on 
those items manufactured in this country so that high wages 
could be paid. 
These two theories have been carried through as the 
general body of this thesis. The general interpretation of 
the application of these theories showed very little 
differentiation for, as I have shown, the economic conditions 
of the country influenced their meaning. I have endeavored 
however, to show that, when this question was discussed 
theoretically and controversially Watterson played an 
important part. But in the more technical and moderate 
discussion of exact rates he had little influence. 
The Wattersonian theory, a liberal reform idea met 
its buffer in the conservative protection ideas, presented 
by Republicans and Democrats and in the moderate protection-
ism of Cleveland, Wilson and others, and because of this, 
failed to find its place in any legislation formulated by 
Congress. Watterson states in his Autobiography that he was 
never a free trader, that a tariff for revenue only was the 
least oppressive from the standpoint of the masses; but his 
q , 
demands were for such a drastic lowering of tariff duties 
that his theory can only be interpreted as practically free 
trade. The earnest appeal of Watterson and his tariff 
reformers has been traced through five presidential terms, 
three of them Republicans and two Democrats. The balance 
of power, in terms of years, was therefore in favor of tlle 
Republican Protectionists; and the additional set-back of 
a split among the Democratic members of both Houses of 
Congress deceived the expectations of the refo~ group. 
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The evidence I have found proves to me that 
Watterson, in respect to the tariff question, never deviated 
from his policy even in the face of losing friends and 
making enemies. His straightforwardness and firmness of 
mind found few equals among his fellow Democrats. Perhaps 
the others were right in favoring compromise, but one must 
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